Do You Make These Simple Mistakes In Bitcoin? October 1, 2023 – Posted in: Business, Advertising – Tags: ,

61. On occasion, the Conspirators facilitated bitcoin payments using the same computers that they used to conduct their hacking activity, including to create and send test spearphishing emails. 57. To facilitate the purchase of infrastructure used in their hacking activity-including hacking into the computers of U.S. 62. The Conspirators funded the purchase of computer infrastructure for their hacking activity in part by “mining” bitcoin. As one of the key agencies involved against tax evasion and money laundering techniques, the IRS supports regulation as a tool to protect against criminal activity. 10. Defendant BORIS ALEKSEYEVICH ANTONOV (Антонов Борис Алексеевич) was a Major in the Russian military assigned to Unit 26165. ANTONOV oversaw a department within Unit 26165 dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations with spearphishing emails and other computer intrusion activity. 19. Defendant ALEKSEY ALEKSANDROVICH POTEMKIN (Потемкин Алексей Александрович) was an officer in the Russian military assigned to Unit 74455. POTEMKIN was a supervisor in a department within Unit 74455 responsible for the administration of computer infrastructure used in cyber operations. 45. The Conspirators conducted operations as Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks using overlapping computer infrastructure and financing.

To further avoid creating a centralized paper trail of all of their purchases, the Conspirators purchased infrastructure using hundreds of different email accounts, in some cases using a new account for each purchase. At or around the same time, they also targeted seventy-six email addresses at the domain for the Clinton Campaign. One of these dedicated accounts, registered with the username “gfade147,” received hundreds of bitcoin payment requests from approximately 100 different email accounts. The block size debate has been and continues to be one of the most pressing issues for the scalability of blockchains going forward. These include 256-bit AES encryption, perfect forward secrecy, a kill switch, and protection against WebRTC, IPv6, and DNS leaks. Between on or about October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016, Organization 1 released approximately thirty-three tranches of documents that had been stolen from the chairman of the Clinton Campaign. The Conspirators also released documents they had stolen in other spearphishing operations, including those they had conducted in 2015 that collected emails from individuals affiliated with the Republican Party. 48. On or about July 22, 2016, Organization 1 released over 20,000 emails and 바이낸스 수수료 (Kelashartanah published a blog post) other documents stolen from the DNC network by the Conspirators. Conspirators transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton Campaign to Organization 1. The Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, discussed the release of the stolen documents and the timing of those releases with Organization 1 to heighten their impact on the 2016 U.S.

Organization 1 did not disclose Guccifer 2.0’s role in providing them. 18. Defendant ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH OSADCHUK (Осадчук Александр Владимирович) was a Colonel in the Russian military and the commanding officer of Unit 74455. Unit 74455 was located at 22 Kirova Street, Khimki, Moscow, a building referred to within the GRU as the “Tower.” Unit 74455 assisted in the release of stolen documents through the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas, the promotion of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU. 16. Defendant PAVEL VYACHESLAVOVICH YERSHOV (Ершов Павел Вячеславович) was a Russian military officer assigned to MORGACHEV’s department within Unit 26165. In or around 2016, YERSHOV assisted KOZACHEK and other co-conspirators in testing and customizing X-Agent malware before actual deployment and use. 17. Defendant ARTEM ANDREYEVICH MALYSHEV (Малышев Артём Андреевич) was a Second Lieutenant in the Russian military assigned to MORGACHEV’s department within Unit 26165. MALYSHEV used a variety of monikers, including “djangomagicdev” and “realblatr.” In or around 2016, MALYSHEV monitored X-Agent malware implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks. 23. Beginning in or around March 2016, the Conspirators, in addition to their spearphishing efforts, researched the DCCC and DNC computer networks to identify technical specifications and vulnerabilities.

32. Despite the Conspirators’ efforts to hide their activity, beginning in or around May 2016, both the DCCC and DNC became aware that they had been hacked and hired a security company (“Company 1”) to identify the extent of the intrusions. Beginning by at least March 2016, the Conspirators targeted over 300 individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, DCCC, and DNC. 31. During the hacking of the DCCC and DNC networks, the Conspirators covered their tracks by intentionally deleting logs and computer files. The Conspirators referred to this computer as a “middle server.” The middle server acted as a proxy to obscure the connection between malware at the DCCC and the Conspirators’ AMS panel. 30. On or about May 30, 2016, MALYSHEV access the AMS panel in order to upgrade custom AMS software on the server. On or about June 20, 2016, the Conspirators deleted logs from the AMS panel that documented their activities on the panel, including the login history. 58. Although the Conspirators caused transactions to be conducted in a variety of currencies, including U.S. For example, on or about April 15, 2016, the Conspirators searched one hacked DCCC computer for terms that included “hillary,” “cruz,” and “trump.” The Conspirators also copied select DCCC folders, including “Benghazi Investigations.” The Conspirators targeted computers containing information such as opposition research and field operation plans for the 2016 elections.